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LANDLORD BOUNTY HUNTERS: QUI TAM AS AN
EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR HOUSING CODE
ENFORCEMENT
Alex Ellefson*
Millions of American renters live in substandard housing.
Conditions in these homes not only affect individual renters’ quality
of life, but in the aggregate create enormous burdens on public
resources in the form of higher healthcare costs, demand for public
benefits, and lower economic productivity. Furthermore, the legacy
of racist housing policies in the United States has concentrated poor
housing conditions in low-income communities of color. This Note
argues that existing methods of housing code enforcement are
inadequate. Instead, housing advocates should turn to an ancient
remedy that has been used to prosecute fraud, labor violations, and
even pirates: qui tam statutes.Qui tam statutes allow private parties
to prosecute claims on behalf of the government and to collect a
portion of the damages recovered. Currently, housing code
enforcement relies on tenants to report code violations and to file
suit when the landlord fails to correct conditions. A qui tam
provision in the housing code would allow tenants to receive a
percentage of the fines assessed against their landlord. Not only
would this create stronger incentives for private parties to enforce
the housing code, which promotes the public interest, it would also
compensate tenants for the time and effort expended pursuing their
right to a decent home.
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2021; B.A., Brooklyn College, 2014.
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INTRODUCTION
The Odimgbe family’s housing conditions were unacceptable.
The hallway outside their apartment contained broken light fixtures
and exposed electrical wiring.1 Inside their home, a busted heater
spewed scorching steam into the air.2 Plaster peeled off the
bathroom walls and the hallway floor needed repair.3 The apartment
was also infested with mice and cockroaches.4 When the landlord
failed to correct violations issued for these conditions, the Odimgbe
family filed suit in Brooklyn Housing Court to force the landlord to
make repairs.5 The lawsuit crawled through the courts for more than
two years.6 During that time, the tenants chose to fix many of the
conditions themselves.7 Once the repairs were completed, the
landlord illegally evicted them from the apartment.8 The court
eventually found the landlord in contempt for violating orders to
make the necessary repairs.9 He was sentenced to imprisonment for
twenty days and fined $1,000.10 The court also levied civil penalties
totaling $9,500 for violations of the housing code.11 For the trouble
suffered by the Odimgbe family, they received the maximum
penalty the court could award for the landlord’s contempt—$250.12
The Odimbge family’s story is tragically unremarkable for low-
income renters.13 Millions of Americans live in substandard








9 Id. at 916.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 915.
12 Id. at 916. See also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 773 (2020) (limiting penalties to
$250, plus attorney’s fees, when moving parties fail to show they are entitled to
actual damages for injuries caused by the contempt of court).
13 Emily A. Benfer & Allyson E. Gold, There’s No Place Like Home:
Reshaping Community Interventions and Policies to Eliminate Environmental
Hazards and Improve Population Health for Low-Income and Minority
Communities, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S1, S3 (2017).
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housing.14 The effects of these conditions not only bear on
individual tenants’ quality of life, but also create enormous social
costs in the aggregate—through higher healthcare costs and
increased need for public benefits, as well as contributing to lower
economic productivity.15 This burden falls heavily on communities
of color, where substandard housing is most concentrated due to
America’s history of racial segregation.16 Furthermore, racist
housing policies have laid the groundwork for the current housing
crunch.17 Today’s affordability crisis is fueled by real estate
speculators who see profits in blighted, urban neighborhoods where
properties can be redeveloped for affluent, white newcomers.18
This Note argues that existing mechanisms for enforcing
housing standards are inadequate. Instead, housing advocates should
turn to an ancient remedy that has proven successful at prosecuting
fraud, labor violations, and even pirates: qui tam statutes.19 Qui tam
is short for the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur,” which translates to “he who brings an
action for the king as well as for himself.”20 In a qui tam statute, the
government allows private citizens to prosecute claims on its behalf
and rewards them with a bounty that represents a portion of the
damages.21 A qui tam provision could empower tenants to act as
Boba Fett-like22 enforcers of the housing code by allowing them to
14 Id.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 34–39.
16 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 50 (2017) (explaining how
discriminatory housing policies and disinvestment contributed to the deterioration
of African American homes, thus “reinforcing their neighborhoods’ slum
conditions”).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 61–68.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 69–75.
19 See infra Part III discussing other areas where qui tam has been applied.
20 J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui
Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 551 (2000).
21 Andrew Elmore, The State Qui Tam to Enforce Employment Law, 69
DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 368 (2020).
22 Boba Fett is a fictional bounty hunter in the Star Wars franchise who
captured the treacherous rogue Han Solo in order to collect the price on his head.
STARWARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1980).
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exact a bounty in exchange for prosecuting their landlords’
transgressions.23
Currently, enforcement agencies issue fines for violations of the
local housing code.24 Some jurisdictions allow tenants to sue if their
landlord fails to remedy the violations.25 However, the suit is merely
a derivative claim on behalf of the government and any monetary
penalties go the enforcement agency rather than the tenant.26 A qui
tam amendment to the housing code would allow tenants to claim a
percentage of those fines as a reward for prosecuting their landlord’s
failure to make repairs.27 Not only would this create stronger
incentives for private parties to enforce the housing code, which
promotes the public interest, it would also compensate tenants for
some of the suffering caused by conditions in their home.28
Part I of this Note surveys housing conditions in the United
States and examines the consequences of those conditions on
affected tenants and on society at large. Part II describes current
methods of housing code enforcement and why those methods have
proved inadequate. Part III details how qui tam statutes work and
how they have been applied in other areas of law. Part IV examines
how a qui tam provision could be incorporated into a housing code
as well as some of the drawbacks that could result from a qui tam
provision.
I. THE STATE OF HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES
In 2019, the U.S. Census Bureau recorded more than 3.3 million
renters living in substandard housing conditions.29 If these
23 See discussion infra Part IV.
24 Marilyn L. Uzdavines, Barking Dogs: Code Enforcement Is All Bark and
No Bite (Unless the Inspectors Have Assault Rifles), 54 WASHBURN L.J. 161, 163
(2014).
25 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115(h) (2020).
26 Amsterdam v. Goldstick, 519 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
27 See discussion infra Part IV.
28 See discussion infra Part IV.
29 See American. Housing Survey 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator
.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). (select area: “National;” select year: “2019;”
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households were located in a single municipality, it would be
America’s third-largest city.30 Some of the conditions recorded
included lack of heat, inadequate plumbing, peeling paint, deficient
electrical wiring, and vermin.31 Substandard housing is most
concentrated in low-income communities of color.32 These areas are
more likely to have older housing stock that require greater upkeep
than newly constructed homes.33 Moreover, some tenants in
substandard housing simply cannot afford to move elsewhere and
fear retaliation from their landlord if they complain.34
The effects of substandard housing can have long-lasting
consequences for tenants’ quality of life.35 The presence of mold,
moisture, and poor air quality can contribute to severe asthma.36 A
survey by the Center for Disease Control linked home environment
to 40% of childhood asthma cases.37 In fact, housing conditions are
behind a range of health problems, such as respiratory disease,
neurological disorders, psychological dysfunction, and the spread of
communicable disease.38 One of the most harmful conditions related
to substandard housing is lead-poisoning.39 Because lead paint was
not prohibited until 1978, this condition is most concentrated in
select table: “Housing Quality;” select tenure filter: “Renter;” click “Get table”)
(recording more that 3.3 million severely and moderately inadequate rentals).
30 See 500 Largest Cities,* by State and Population, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/places/about/500-cities-2016-2019/pdfs/500-
cities-by-state.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (showing the current third largest
city is Chicago, which has a population of 2.6 million).
31 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 29.
32 Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S10.
33 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 16, at 65.
34 PETERMOSKOWITZ, HOW TOKILL ACITY: GENTRIFICATION, INEQUALITY,
AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD 183 (2017).
35 Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health and Housing: Altruistic Medicalization of
America’s Affordability Crisis, 81 LAW& CONTEMP. PROB. 161, 166 (2018).
36 Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for
the Elimination of Health Inequality and Social Justice, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 275,
296 (2015).
37 Megan Sandel & Matthew Desmond, Investing in Housing for Health
Improves Both Mission and Margin, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2291, 2291 (2017).
38 Matthew, supra note 35, at 166.
39 Benfer, supra note 36, at 293.
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older housing stock.40 Lead paint flakes can be inhaled by residents,
causing severe health complications.41 Lead poisoning affects many
important body functions, such as the cardiovascular, reproductive,
immune, nervous, digestive, kidney, and renal systems.42
The burden of poor housing can also result in economic harm.43
The stress of living in unsafe housing has been linked to cognitive
and psychological problems.44 A study by the United States Housing
Corporation concluded that poor housing reduces worker output.45
The report detailed how household conditions—such as inadequate
plumbing, poor lighting and ventilation, overcrowding, poor
drainage, and structural defects—lower productivity by causing
workers to feel “cheerlessness” as well as “nervous fatigue and
sleeplessness.”46 These problems also affect the household’s
children, who report trouble concentrating in school because of
environmental stresses.47
In the aggerate, these problems have enormous social costs.
Asthma alone costs the economy $56 billion each year.48 It also
contributes annually to fourteen million missed school days, two
million emergency room visits, and 500,000 hospitalizations.49 Lead
poisoning also has an enormous impact on society.50 Researchers
estimate that lead poisoning has lowered America’s population IQ
40 Id. at 293–94.
41 Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S5.
42 Id.
43 Matthew, supra note 35, at 181.
44 Ericka Petersen, Building a House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in
Evictions, 16 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 63, 69 (2020).
45 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF INDUS. HOUS. & TRANSP., REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES HOUSING CORPORATION: WAR EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION
VOL. 1, 1-2 (1920).
46 Id. at 2.
47 Samiya A. Bashir, Home Is Where the Harm Is: Inadequate Housing as a
Public Health Crisis, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 733, 737 (2002).
48 Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S7.
49 Tracey Ross et al., Creating Safe and Healthy Living Environments for
Low-Income Families, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (July 20, 2016, 12:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2016/07/20/141324/cr
eating-safe-and-healthy-living-environments-for-low-income-families/.
50 Benfer, supra note 36, at 295.
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by five points.51 This has doubled the number of people who qualify
for special education and has been linked to an additional $11–53
billion in healthcare costs, $165–233 billion in lost lifetime
earnings, and $25–35 billion in lost tax revenue.52 Furthermore,
those whose homelife causes them to miss out on academic or work
opportunities are more likely to require public assistance, creating
an additional social cost.53
The concentration of substandard housing in communities of
color is a consequence of America’s shameful history of racial
segregation.54 As Richard Rothstein details in The Color of Law,
African Americans were barred from moving into white
neighborhoods through explicitly racist zoning laws and racial
covenants.55 When the Supreme Court found these practices
unconstitutional, municipalities were able to achieve the same result
by enacting exclusionary zoning ordinances to block construction of
affordable housing that could be rented by Black families.56
Furthermore, the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), created
by the Roosevelt Administration in 1934, began a process of
“redlining” neighborhoods with Black residents, thereby making
those areas ineligible for federally subsidized mortgages.57 The
FHA encouraged banks to issue mortgages for newly built housing
in the suburbs and to avoid lending in urban areas.58 The agency
reasoned that the denser, older housing stock in cities was a riskier
investment.59 These policies combined to accelerate white flight to
suburbs while African Americans were confined to urban ghettos
where much of the housing stock was older and in disrepair.60
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27
GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 106–07 (2019).
54 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 16, at 50.
55 Id. at 44.
56 Id. at 45, 48.
57 Id. at 64–65.
58 Id. at 65.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 65, 75, 186.
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This history explains why the burden of hazardous conditions
falls most heavily on people of color.61 Segregation has made Black
tenants vulnerable to predatory real estate practices.62 Landlords can
charge high rents and neglect to make repairs when their tenants
have few alternatives for housing.63 In some cases, landlords
deliberately let their buildings deteriorate until they become
uninhabitable.64 At one Virginia development, a court in 2018
placed an apartment complex in receivership in order to prevent
further deterioration of the property.65 More than a quarter of the
complex’s 900 units had already been condemned, placing many
residents at risk of homelessness; but the owners, who for years
aggressively pursued rent while refusing to make repairs, were able
to escape liability by hiding behind a limited liability company.66
Economists call this process “filtering,”67 which describes how a
home, as it ages, filters down lower price tiers until it is eventually
demolished or abandoned.68
61 Petersen, supra note 44, at 108.
62 On July 10, 1966, Martin Luther King Jr. gave a speech about housing
discrimination at Chicago’s Soldier Field in which he stated: “We are here today
because we are tired. We are tired of being seared in the flames of withering
injustice. We are tired of paying more for less. We are tired of living in rat-infested
slums and in the Chicago Housing Authority’s cement reservations. We are tired
of having to pay a median rent of $97 a month in Lawndale for four rooms, while
whites in South Deering pay $73 a month for five rooms.” Betsy Schlabach, “Our
Emancipation Day”: Martin Luther King Jr. in Chicago, BLACK PERSPECTIVES
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.aaihs.org/our-emancipation-day-martin-luther-king-
jr-in-chicago/.
63 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 34, at 38.
64 Robin Powers Kinning, Selective Housing Code Enforcement and Low-
Income Housing Policy: Minneapolis Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159,
169 (1993).
65 Kelly Avellino, New Hope for Embattled Richmond Flats at Ginter Park
Apartments, NBC12 (July 19, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.nbc12.com/story
/38683234/new-hope-for-embattled-richmond-flats-at-ginter-park-apartments/.
66 The Scarlet E, Part III: Tenants and Landlords, WNYC STUDIOS: ON THE
MEDIA (June 21, 2019), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/episodes
/scarlet-e-part-iii-tenants-and-landlords.
67 H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 29, 40 (1996).
68 Id. at 41.
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Geographer Neil Smith observed how the filtering process
creates an opportunity for real estate speculators.69 When a property
depreciates in value because its landlord neglected to make repairs,
there is a higher profit potential for developers who purchase the
property in advance of gentrification.70 Smith examined tax records
in certain New York City neighborhoods and found that those
neighborhoods gentrified after buildings reached “their highest level
of tax debt.”71 As author Peter Moskowtiz observed, this behavior
signaled that landlords were “milking [their] buildings by not doing
repairs or paying their taxes in preparation for flipping them.”72 His
findings were supported by a subsequent study conducted by the
University of Chicago Booth School of Business.73 Researchers
found that when a gentrifying neighborhood was near a poor
neighborhood and a middle-class neighborhood, the poor
neighborhood would gentrify faster.74 This suggests low-income
neighborhoods are more attractive to investors because there is an
opportunity for a higher rate of return.75
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO ENFORCING HOUSING STANDARDS
A. Housing Codes
Housing codes were introduced to interrupt the process of urban
decay.76 New York City passed America’s first housing code when
it adopted the Tenement House Act of 1867.77 The law created
69 See Neil Smith, Gentrification and Uneven Development, 58 ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 139, 149 (1982).
70 Id.; see also BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991) (containing a
scene in which Furious explains how gentrification occurs when real estate
interests bring down property values in Black neighborhoods so that residents can
be moved out and the land resold at a profit).
71 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 34, at 39.
72 Id. at 38.
73 Veronica Guerrieri et al., Endogenous Gentrification and Housing Price
Dynamics 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16237, 2010).
74 Id.
75 MOSKOWITZ, supra note 34, at 106.
76 Ross, supra note 67, at 41.
77 Id. at 31.
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requirements for residential buildings to have proper sanitation
facilities, fire safety standards, and access to light and air in each
apartment.78 Since that time, the city’s housing code evolved to
cover a variety of quality-of-life issues, such as mold, adequate
heating, proper locking mechanisms, hot water, smoke detectors,
illegal basement dwellings, and vermin eradication.79 Similar
measures have been adopted in most American cities.80
However, the agencies charged with enforcing housing codes
often have inadequate resources to enforce the law.81 Some
communities have only a handful of officials tasked with
investigating complaints.82 At one time, Lexington, Kentucky had
two officials dedicated to housing code enforcement for its
population of 300,000 residents.83 In Cincinnati, Ohio, a single
housing inspector was responsible for managing cases at 600
properties.84 In New York City, one of the country’s most
progressive jurisdictions when it comes to tenants’ rights,85 there
were 333 inspectors devoted to housing code enforcement in 2018.86
78 See id. (describing how the Tenement House Act of 1867 set standards for
“roofs, ventilation, toilets, fire escapes, garbage receptacles, and other related
matters”).
79 HP Actions (For Repairs and Services), MET COUNCIL ON HOUSING,
https://www.metcouncilonhousing.org/help-answers/hp-actions-for-repairs-and-
services/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2020).
80 Ross, supra note 67, at 29.
81 Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 169.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 170.
84 Id.
85 Oksana Mironova, Right to Counsel and Stronger Rent Laws Helped




growing%20nationwide (detailing how New York City was the first jurisdiction
in the country to guarantee legal representation for low-income tenants facing
eviction).
86 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. AND DEV., REPORT OF THE FINANCE
DIVISION 24 (Mar. 22, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads
/sites/54/2019/03/806-HPD-2020.pdf.
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However, those inspectors were responsible for responding to
530,619 complaints.87
Most jurisdictions dedicate few resources to proactively
searching for hazardous conditions.88 Instead, the tenant must
initiate the enforcement process by making a complaint.89 When a
complaint is made, a government agent comes to inspect the
premises and issue violations for conditions that violate the code.90
Typically, the landlord will have a certain number of days to correct
the conditions.91 If the conditions are not corrected within the
specified frame, the agency responsible for housing code
enforcement can bring an action to impose civil penalties against the
property owner.92 In cities such as New York, tenants can also bring
an action against their landlord to impose penalties if the violations
are not corrected.93 However, such claims are derivative actions,
meaning any fines assessed are awarded to the government, rather
than the tenant, and the government may intervene at any time to
settle the case without the tenant’s consent.94 A 2003 report by the
City-Wide Task Force on Housing Court found that 82% of the
cases brought to enforce New York’s Housing Maintenance Code
were tenant-initiated.95 In these cases, few of the tenants were
represented by an attorney, while the majority of landlords had
counsel.96 Because of this disparity, the report found there were
numerous obstacles tenants had to overcome, such as repeatedly
having to take time off work and arranging for child care because of
adjournments requested by the landlord’s attorney.97 These
obstacles serve to discourage tenants from bringing a case, thereby
87 Id.
88 Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 163–64.
89 Id. at 163.
90 Id. at 164–65.
91 Id. at 165.
92 Id. at 167.
93 SeeN.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115 (2020).
94 Amsterdam v. Goldstick, 519 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
95 CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. CT., NO RAINBOW, NO GOLD:
TENANT-INITIATED HP ACTIONS IN THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 13
(May 2003), https://www.gothamgazette.com/graphics/HP_Actions_Report.pdf.
96 See id. at 9.
97 Id.
LANDLORD BOUNTY HUNTERS 471
allowing unsafe housing conditions to continue unabated.98
Furthermore, housing codes do not provide compensation to tenants
who have suffered injuries as a result of their landlord’s neglect.99
Instead, victorious tenants simply win the safe housing conditions
to which they were always entitled.100
B. Private Causes of Action
Tenants can bring private causes of action for damages caused
by their landlords’ failure to make repairs. In the 1970s, courts
initiated a “revolution” in landlord-tenant law by borrowing
doctrines from tort and contract law.101 Previously, the tenant’s duty
to pay rent was independent of the landlord’s obligation to maintain
the premises.102 Furthermore, the common law doctrine of caveat
lessee shielded landlords from liability for injuries that occurred on
leased properties.103 Perhaps the most famous case to come out of
the “revolution” in landlord-tenant law is Javins v. First National
Realty Corp., where the D.C. circuit court tied the duty to pay rent
to the landlord’s duty to make the premises habitable.104 The court
pointed out that the old common law rule made sense in an agrarian
society, where the value of the lease was in the land.105 However,
the doctrine was unsatisfactory in a modern, urban environment,
where it was understood that a lease for a residential unit conveyed
a “package of goods and services—a package which includes not
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and
98 Id. at 10.
99 See Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S33.
100 New Haverford P’ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 795 (Del. 2001) (finding
that the housing code imposed “a duty on landlords to maintain the leased
premises in a safe, sanitary condition”).
101 Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court
Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 147–49 (2020).
102 Id. at 154.
103 Edward H. Rabin, Symposium: The Revolution in Residential Landlord-
Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 529 (1984).
104 Alan M.Weinberger, Teaching Property Law: Up from Javins: A 50-year
Retrospective on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 443,
443–44 (2020).
105 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.”106 The court
fashioned a remedy through the implied warranty of habitability,
which made the payment of rent dependent on the landlord’s duty to
maintain the premises.107 Most damages for warranty of habitability
claims are awarded in the form of a rent abatement, which is
measured by the difference in value of the property in its current
condition and its value as warranted.108
The old common law doctrine of caveat lessee also protected
landlords from liability for injuries on their property.109 Sargent v.
Ross is the seminal case creating liability for landlords who fail to
exercise reasonable care in making their properties safe for
tenants.110 The case allowed tenants to bring a cause of action in tort
when they suffered an injury caused by their landlord’s
negligence.111
This seismic shift in the law during the 1970s was the fruit of
sustained advocacy by tenant activists, lawyers, and scholars.112 The
implied warranty of habitability spread quickly throughout the
country.113 It has since been adopted by every state except
Arkansas.114 In many places, these changes were expected to
supplement the local housing codes, which proved inadequate at
forcing landlords to make repairs.115 The advances in tort and
contract law were expected to be more effective tools at reversing
the urban decay that followed white flight.116
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1082.
108 Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 121–22.
109 Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973).
110 Rabin, supra note 103, at 529.
111 Sargent, 308 A.2d at 534.
112 Summers, supra note 101, at 153.
113 Id. at 160.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 156, 161.
116 See id. at 155–56, 161 (discussing how reforms to landlord tenant law
were expected to reverse the urban decay that accompanied demographic shifts in
the 1960s and 1970s).
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Instead, the results have been disappointing.117 One study in
NewYork City housing court found that less than 2% of tenants who
had a meritorious claim for warranty of habitability received a rent
abatement.118 Moreover, courts have proved ill-equipped at
enforcing their orders to make repairs.119 For those few tenants who
successfully raised a warranty of habitability claim, the repairs were
still outstanding at a subsequent court appearance in 72% of
cases.120
Several reasons have been advanced for the lackluster
performance of the warranty of habitability. In some instances, the
problems are procedural. Some jurisdictions require notice to the
landlord be provided through an official housing code violation
report.121 Therefore, the tenant cannot raise the doctrine even when
the complaint to the landlord was recorded in a letter or email.122
Other jurisdictions require that the tenant withhold rent in “good
faith” to force the landlord to make repairs.123 This means the
warranty of habitability is unavailable for tenants who have fallen
behind on rent for other reasons, but whose living conditions could
have entitled them to an abatement.124 Another obstacle particularly
burdensome for low-income tenants is a requirement that the tenant
deposit rent in an escrow account in order to raise a warranty of
habitability defense in an eviction proceeding for unpaid rent.125 In
such a case, a tenant would be unlikely to have money to put in
escrow, especially when the money that would have gone toward
rent was used to cope with conditions of disrepair—such as by
purchasing heaters, hot plates, or replacing damaged possessions.126
117 Serge Martinez, Revitalizing the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 34
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 240 (2020).
118 Summers, supra note 101, at 150.
119 Id. at 151.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 164.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 162.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 163.
126 Id.
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Furthermore, some courts have walked back some of the
advances made in tenants’ rights during the 1970s.127 For example,
a New York appellate court, in Beck v. J.J.A. Holding Corp., came
to the fantastical conclusion that mold is not a foreseeable
consequence of flooding, effectively kneecapping future tort claims
against landlords who fail to remedy water damage at their
properties.128
Another obstacle to the success of private enforcement actions
is the way contract and tort law devalues poor persons’ claims.129
Law Professor Kathryn Sabbeth argues in her article,
(Under)enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, that poverty in itself
is an obstacle to housing justice.130 She points out that the
“prevailing methods for calculating damages incorporate biases of
class, race, and gender, and they underestimate the value of poor
tenants’ cases.”131 Sabbath notes that those able to afford legal
representation are also able to avoid substandard housing
conditions.132 By contrast, low-income tenants need to resort to
contingency fees to induce representation from private attorneys.133
However, this is difficult because damages are often related to the
claimant’s social position.134 For example, if conditions cause the
tenant to miss work, damages will be much higher for a professional
than an hourly worker making minimum wage.135 Furthermore,
higher earners can expend funds to mitigate their injuries—such as
moving to a hotel or ordering take-out food—that can be recouped
in a tort claim.136 Poor tenants are also less likely to own possessions
of significant value that will result in meaningful damage awards if
those items are destroyed.137
127 Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S36.
128 Beck v. J.J.A. Holding Corp., 785 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004).
129 Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 121.
130 Id. at 101.
131 Id. at 103.
132 Id. at 120.
133 Id. at 121.
134 Id. at 123.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 124.
137 Id. at 123.
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This means that when tenants raise tort and warranty claims, it
is often as a defense in eviction cases.138 This limits the effectiveness
of the claim because the landlord has a strategic advantage in
choosing when and where the lawsuit will take place.139 Tenants
facing eviction also have a weaker bargaining position because they
risk losing their home and are therefore more amenable to
compromising on their right to repairs.140 This is particularly
noteworthy for jurisdictions with right-to-counsel legislation
because the right to an attorney is only guaranteed for low-income
renters in eviction proceedings, not for affirmative cases requesting
repairs.141
III. THE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OFQUI TAM STATUTES
In a qui tam action, the state assigns part of its interest to a
private citizen, called a “relator,” who prosecutes the claim on
behalf of the state.142 Qui tam statutes require the relator to have a
special interest in the case, usually in the form of special knowledge
about the alleged offense.143 As a reward for prosecuting the claim,
the relator is entitled to a portion of the damages.144 The difference
between qui tam and a private action is that the plaintiff is seeking
to vindicate the rights of the state, instead of the individual’s own
rights.145 The state will therefore always retain some interest and
will have the right to intervene in the litigation.146
Qui tam statutes came to the United States from England, where
they were in use for more than 1,000 years.147 However, qui tam can
138 Id. at 142.
139 Id. at 143.
140 Id.
141 Frequently Asked Questions About RTCNYC, RIGHT TO COUNS. NYC
COAL., https://www.righttocounselnyc.org/faq (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
142 Elmore, supra note 21, at 368.
143 Id. at 371.
144 Id. at 368.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 361.
147 See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 381, 385 (2001) (explaining that one of England’s earliest qui tam
provisions became law in the year 695).
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be traced back to Ancient Rome, which offered private citizens a
reward for successfully prosecuting criminals.148 In England, some
of the first qui tam provisions were used to enforce laws that
prohibited labor on the Sabbath and maintained price controls for
certain goods.149 Another statute maintained limits on wages.150
British Parliament viewed rising wages caused by a labor shortage
during the plague as a form of “economic opportunism by the
working classes.”151 The law’s qui tam provision sought to recruit
informers to help enforce the wage controls.152
Qui tam maintained its popularity in the New World.153 Several
of the colonies had qui tam laws on the books.154 In 1692, New York
passed the Act for the Restraining and Punishing of Privateers and
Pirates, which allowed private citizens to bring qui tam actions
against public officers who failed to carry out their duty to pursue
pirates.155 After the American Revolution, the new government
enacted several qui tam laws and would continue to pass qui tam
provisions throughout the nineteenth century.156 Four of these
remain in force.157 The federal False Claims Act (“FCA”)—used to
prosecute fraud against the federal government—is the most notable
surviving qui tam statute in the United States.158 Many states also
have their own version of the FCA.159 In fact, qui tam has
experienced a revival among state governments during the twenty-
first century.160 It has been proposed in the areas of consumer
protection, housing and employment discrimination laws, and
148 Id. at 385.
149 Id.
150 Beck, supra note 20, at 570.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Bales, supra note 147, at 387.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 387 n.36.
156 Id. at 387.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 388.
159 Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public
Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 955–56 (2007).
160 Elmore, supra note 21, at 359.
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safety-and-health standards.161 California has had success enforcing
its labor code through a qui tam statute called the Private Attorney
General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).162
Over the years, federal qui tam statutes have survived several
constitutional challenges.163 Most recently, in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, where the
Supreme Court held that the FCA did not violate the Constitution’s
Article III standing provision.164 The court determined that the FCA
satisfied the standing requirement because the government made a
partial assignment of its claim to the relator, who may pursue the
claim with or without the government’s intervention.165 While the
issue of Article III standing discussed in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources is only applicable to federal laws, state qui tam statutes
would be subject to the Constitution’s Article III standing
requirements if they were brought in federal court.166 Furthermore,
State qui tam statutes are constrained by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment when the penalties are punitive in nature.167
Qui tam statutes fall into two categories: (1) those that allow
injured parties to bring a claim on behalf of the state (as well as their
own interests) and (2) those that allow informers to obtain a portion
of the penalty as a bounty, even if the private actor did not suffer
any injury.168 The first category is called an “aggrieved party”
statute.169 The second category is called a “whistleblower”
statute.170 The FCA is the leading example of a whistleblower
161 Id. at 361.
162 Id. at 372.
163 See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (determining that a relator has standing to sue on behalf of
the United States under the FCA); United States ex rel.Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 545 (1943) (finding that qui tam suits seeking civil penalties for criminal
conduct did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution).
164 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 778.
165 Id. at 773–74.
166 Elmore, supra note 21, at 392.
167 Id. at 403.
168 Id. at 368.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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statute, while PAGA is an example of an aggrieved party statute.171
As such, it is instructive to examine the mechanics of each of these
laws in greater detail.
A. Federal False Claims Act
The FCA allows for the prosecution of those who commit fraud
against the government.172 Because it is a whistleblower statute,
instead of an aggrieved party statute, it is not necessary for relators
to have suffered an injury. Instead, they are required to be an
“original source” of information about the alleged fraud173—a
provision aimed at preventing relators from profiting from
prosecutions already undertaken by the government.174 The relator
serves the complaint on the government, rather than the
defendant.175 After receiving the complaint, the Attorney General
has sixty days to decide whether to intervene.176 Following the sixty-
day period, the government may intervene only after a showing of
“good cause.”177 If the government intervenes, it bears the primary
responsibility of prosecuting the case.178 The relator will maintain
an interest and collect up to 25% of the award.179 If the Attorney
General declines to intervene, the relator may proceed on its own
and collect up to 30% of the award if the claim is successful.180
The FCA was originally enacted in 1863 in order to stop
“massive frauds” committed by defense contractors during the Civil
War.181 Congress believed public officials suspected of perpetuating
the frauds would be unwilling participants in prosecution efforts and
added a qui tam provision to incentivize citizens to act as private
171 Id. at 368–69.
172 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
173 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
174 Bales, supra note 147, at 389.
175 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
176 Id.
177 Id. §§ 3730(b)(2), (c)(3).
178 Id. § 3730(c)(1).
179 Id. §§ 3730(c)(1), (d)(1).
180 Id. § 3730(d)(2).
181 Bales, supra note 147, at 388.
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attorneys general.182 As originally written, the FCA allowed for
double damages, imposed a mandatory $2,000 civil penalty for each
claim, and allowed relators to claim one-half of the award.183 The
government was allowed to intervene at any time and for any
reason.184 However, following World War II, the role of the federal
government expanded, creating more opportunities for private
actors to abuse the statute. Because the law did not require the relator
to possess independently obtained information, informers would
rush to file claims as soon as criminal indictments issued.185
Congress responded to this activity by rewriting the FCA to reduce
relator awards and prohibit qui tam actions based on public
knowledge.186 This last change effectively ended qui tam action
through the FCA because courts interpreted the new language to bar
any claims based on information known to the government, even
when that knowledge was known to the government only because
the relator reported it.187
However, public outrage during the 1980s at reports of Defense
Department spending on $435 hammers, $640 toilet seat covers, and
$7,622 coffee makers, caused lawmakers to revisit the FCA’s qui
tam provision.188 In order to crack down on these excessive
payments to defense contractors, in 1986 Congress increased the
financial incentives for relators to bring a claim.189 More
importantly, the ban on claims based on information already known
to the government was watered down so that claims were barred
only when they were based upon “publicly disclosed” information
from (1) a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, (2) a
congressional or General Accounting Report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or (3) the news media.190 Furthermore, qui tam actions
under the FCA could be based on publicly disclosed information
182 Id. at 388–89.
183 Id. at 389.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 389–90.
187 Id. at 390; see also U.S. ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue
Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2016).
188 Beck, supra note 20, at 561.
189 Id. at 561, 562.
190 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
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when the relator was an “original source” of the information.191
These changes were effective in encouraging the private bar to
litigate FCA claims.192 In 2017, the Department of Justice reported
that whistleblowers were responsible for $3.4 billion of the $3.7
billion in settlements and judgements for claims of fraud against the
federal government.193 The lion’s share of the cases were for
healthcare (generally Medicare and Medicaid) fraud.194
B. California’s Private Attorney General Act of 2004
(“PAGA”)
PAGA allows workers who allege violations of the state’s labor
code to pursue civil penalties against their employer.195 Unlike the
FCA, which requires relators to have unique knowledge of the
offense, PAGA limits assignment to aggrieved employees.196 The
statute allows a victorious relator to claim 25% of the penalty, as
well as attorneys’ fees.197 The relator must notify California’s Labor
and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), as well as the
employer, about the workplace violations.198 The LWDA has sixty-
five days to decide whether to intervene.199 The agency may not
intervene once the initial review period has passed.200 For some
violations, the employer has an opportunity to cure before the
PAGA claim can proceed.201 Furthermore, PAGA does not allow
qui tam claims for technical violations of the Labor Code, such as
191 Id.
192 Elmore, supra note 21, at 369.
193 Id.
194 Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns that Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers:
Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity
for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims Act?, 83
BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2018).
195 Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698–2699.6 (2020).
196 Elmore, supra note 21, at 368, 371.
197 Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699(i), (g) (2020).
198 Id. § 2699.3(a)(1)(A) (2020).
199 Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(B).
200 Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(A).
201 Id. § 2699.3(c)(2).
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violations related to posting, notice, agency reporting, or filing
requirements.202
California enacted PAGA in 2003.203 Its legislature fashioned
the law in response to findings that the LWDA had been grossly
ineffective at enforcing the state’s labor laws.204 The state had
allocated more than $42 million and 460 employees to labor code
enforcement,205 and despite these resources, reports indicated
rampant abuse of the state’s wage and hour laws.206 One report by
the U.S. Department of Labor estimated there were 33,000 ongoing
wage violations by employers in the Los Angeles garment
industry.207 However, fewer than 100 wage citations were being
issued per year in the entire state.208
Since its enactment, PAGA has become enormously popular.209
During its initial year, the state collected $20,900 in PAGA
penalties.210 That number increased to $34,640,059 in fiscal year
2017–2018.211 On average, there are between 4,000–7,000 PAGA
claims filed by relators each year.212 This is more than twice the
number of actions by the California Bureau of Field Enforcement,
which is charged with identifying employment law violations.213
Other states have considered passing statutes similar to
PAGA.214 Most of these proposals followed the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Epic Systems v. Lewis, which found that
the Federal Arbitration Act authorized employment contracts
mandating individual arbitration for any employee-employer
202 Id. § 2699(g)(2).
203 Ivan Munoz, Note, Has PAGA Met Its Final Match? Continued
Expansion of California’s Private Attorneys General Act Leads to Trade Group’s
Constitutional Challenge, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 397, 403 (2020).
204 Id. at 401.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 401–02.
207 Id. at 401.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 399.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Elmore, supra note 21, at 372.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 387–88.
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disputes.215 This holding significantly curtailed a worker’s ability to
bring a class action against their employer—thereby making it cost
prohibitive for many workers to hire an attorney to litigate their
individual grievance.216 In response to the holding in Epic Systems,
legislatures in seven states began exploring qui tam employment
statutes modeled after PAGA.217
While state qui tam statutes, such as PAGA, would not be
subject to Article III scrutiny in state courts, they must avoid
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections,
which do not allow grossly excessive punishments, and the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.218 The California legislature
sought to avoid violating these rights by including language in
PAGA that allows courts to lower awards when the amounts are
“unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”219 The law also
attempts to avoid due process violations by preventing redundant
claims, meaning that a PAGA judgement is binding on any
aggrieved party not involved in the proceeding, including the
government.220
IV. APPLYINGQUI TAM TO HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT
In the same way that California was unable to adequately
enforce its labor codes before PAGA’s enactment,221 municipalities
across the United States are currently struggling to enforce their
housing codes.222 A qui tam provision would ramp up enforcement
by creating financial rewards for parties who sue to force their
landlord to make repairs.223 This would promote the public interest:
it would reduce the enormous social costs associated with poor
housing and reverse the process of divestment and deterioration that
215 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
216 Elmore, supra note 21, at 387.
217 Id. at 387–88.
218 Id. at 395, 403.
219 Id. at 404.
220 Id. at 405.
221 Munoz, supra note 203, at 401.
222 Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 169.
223 See Beck, supra note 20, at 562; see alsoMunoz, supra note 203, at 401.
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makes communities vulnerable to gentrification.224 Moreover, in
some jurisdictions, converting existing housing codes to include qui
tam provisions would be relatively simple. Tenants can already
bring a claim on behalf of the government through a derivative
action.225 A qui tam provision would simply allow those tenants to
keep a percentage of the penalties.226 The following sections explore
these issues in greater detail.
A. A Qui Tam Provision Would Be Fair for Tenants
The current system is heavily dependent on tenants to pursue the
public’s interest in preventing unsafe housing conditions.227
Jurisdictions rely on tenant complaints to locate violations.228
Furthermore, tenants initiate many of the enforcement actions
against landlords who fail to correct violations.229 To successfully
prosecute these claims, tenants must overcome numerous obstacles:
they must take time off work, pay fees, and respond to changes in
the court’s schedule.230 The state provides no compensation for
these efforts,231 even though they promote a public good.232
Better enforcement would arguably reduce some of the social
costs associated with bad housing, such as higher healthcare and
public benefit payments, as well as lower economic productivity.233
Furthermore, aggressive prosecution efforts would bring in more
224 See supra Part I (discussing the social costs of substandard housing).
225 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115 (2020).
226 See supra Part III (discussing how qui tam allows relators to claim a
portion of the award).
227 See Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 169; CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ONHOUS.
CT., supra note 95, at 13 (discussing how housing code enforcement relies on
tenants to make complaints and sue for repairs).
228 Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 163–64.
229 CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ONHOUSING COURT, supra note 95, at 13.
230 Id. at 9.
231 See Benfer & Gold, supra note 13, at S33.
232 See Benfer, supra note 36, at 295 (describing the social costs associated
with poor housing conditions).
233 See Benfer, supra note 36, at 295; Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 107; U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 45, at 3 (discussing the social costs of substandard
housing).
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government revenue through civil penalties.234 A qui tam provision
in the housing code would recognize and reward the public good
advanced by tenants who pursue their right to repairs.235 The money
could go towards compensating pro se tenants for their time and
effort bringing the claim, or could be used to hire an attorney.236
B. Qui Tam Would Help Tenants Finance Their
Enforcement Actions
As explained by Professor Sabbeth, biases of class, race, and
gender in contract and tort law undervalue damage awards for poor
tenants.237 The low dollar amounts of these awards make it difficult
for tenants to finance their lawsuits through contingency fees.238
This means that those who are most in need of legal remedies—low-
income tenants of color who are more likely to live in substandard
housing—are in the worst position to bring lawsuits.239
This situation could be different with a qui tam provision, even
without a requirement that the landlord pay attorney fees.240 For
example, NewYork City can fine landlords up to $500 per day when
a tenant is without heat and hot water.241 In a case where there has
been no heat for several months, a percentage of those fines would
exceed the rent abatement a low-income tenant would likely obtain
through the implied warranty of habitability.242 Moreover, attorneys
234 See Munoz, supra note 203, at 399 (demonstrating how qui tam
drastically increased revenue to the state through labor violations).
235 See supra Part I (discussing the social costs of substandard housing).
236 See CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUSING COURT, supra note 95, at 9
(reporting that there were numerous obstacles tenants had to overcome, such as
repeatedly having to take time off work and arranging for childcare because of
adjournments requested by the landlord’s attorney).
237 Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 103.
238 Id. at 120.
239 Id.
240 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g) (2020) (providing for attorney’s fees to
victorious relators).
241 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 27-2029, 27-2031 (2020).
242 In October 2020, the average rent in Manhattan was $2,990. If a tenant
was without hot water for three months, the fines could reach $45,000. In a qui
tam statute that awarded the tenant 25% of the damages, the tenant could receive
$11,250. This is greater than the maximum of $8,970 a tenant could receive if
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could reap a high contingency fee by representing a group of tenants
in a repair case against a slumlord.243 Some cases where there were
building-wide housing code violations resulted in penalties that
exceeded $1 million.244
C. Qui Tam Would Promote Housing Justice
There are not only economic issues involved here. A qui tam
housing provision could also promote housing justice. As discussed
in Part I, racist housing policies have concentrated substandard
housing in communities of color.245 This has made minority
communities vulnerable to the displacement that accompanies
gentrification.246 Aggressive code enforcement through qui tam
legislation would be a powerful weapon against landlords who try
to exploit tenants with limited housing options.247 Furthermore, it
could interrupt the filtering process that lays the groundwork for
gentrification by preventing properties from deteriorating to the
they lived in an averagely priced apartment and the abatement discounted their
entire rent. See Eyewitness News, Manhattan Average Rent Drops Below $3,000
for First Time in Nearly a Decade, Report Finds, ABC7 (Oct. 23, 2020), https://
abc7ny.com/manhattan-rent-apartments-for-average-in-new-york-city-midtown
/7256900/ (reporting that the average rent in Manhattan in October 2020 was
$2,990).
243 I.e., a landlord “who receives unusually large profits from substandard,
poorly maintained properties.” Slumlord, Merriam-Webster, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slumlord (last visited April 18, 2021).
244 A court found that a residential building had eighty-two open Class B
violations, which required a penalty of $25 per violation and $10 per day, per
violation, and those violations were not corrected for 444 days, resulting in a
penalty of $366,130. There were also eleven open Class C violations, which
required a penalty of $50 per violation and $125 per day, per violation, and those
violations were not corrected for 461 days, resulting in a penalty of $634,425. The
total fines amounted to $1,000,555. DHPD v. One 35 W. Corp., 9 N.Y.S.3d 592,
592 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2015).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 61–68.
246 See Schlabach, supra note 62 (comparing housing conditions in Black
and White communities).
247 SeeMOSKOWITZ, supra note 34, at 38 (describing how landlords can take
advantage of tenants who have few alternatives for housing).
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point where they must be destroyed or abandoned.248 When
combined with rent control or other forms of rent regulation—for
example, those that limit evictions by requiring a showing of good
cause—a qui tam housing code could be an effective tool for
maintaining stable, healthy, and secure communities.249
D. What Would Qui Tam Look Like in a Housing Code?
A qui tam housing statute could be modeled on NewYork City’s
current Housing Maintenance Code.250 New York City allows a
tenant to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the city seeking an
injunction requiring the landlord to make repairs and assessing civil
penalties for failure to correct violations.251 The tenant benefits from
the repairs, but the fines are paid to the city.252 A qui tam provision
would tweak this situation so that claimants would be entitled to a
portion of the penalties.253 This would compensate the tenant for the
costs of bringing the claim254 as well as some of the injuries caused
by the lack of repairs.255 It would also recognize the tenant’s good
deed in promoting the public interest.256
Adapting housing codes to incorporate qui tam would seem to
favor an aggrieved party statute, rather than a whistleblower statute.
248 See Smith, supra note 69, at 149 (explaining how “filtering” lays the
groundwork for gentrification by reducing property values).
249 See Vicki Been et al., Symposium: One Hundred Years of Rent Control:
An Examination of the Past and Future of Rental Housing: Article: Laboratories
of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1071–73 (2019) (discussing how rent control could
work with housing codes to combat gentrification).
250 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 27-2001–27-2153 (2020).
251 Id. § 27-2115 (2020).
252 Amsterdam v. Goldstick, 519 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
253 See Elmore, supra note 21, at 368 (describing how qui tam allows relators
to keep a portion of the damages).
254 See CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. CT., supra note 95, at 9
(explaining the costs tenants bear bringing a suit to force repairs).
255 See Benfer, supra note 36, at 295; Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 107; U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 45, at 2 (describing the many injuries tenants
experience as a result of substandard housing).
256 See Benfer, supra note 36, at 295 (describing the social costs associated
with poor housing conditions).
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A whistleblower statute would require a more substantial overhaul
of existing regulations. For example, New York City only gives
standing for tenants and lawful occupants to bring a derivative case
for housing repairs.257 A whistleblower statute would therefore
require amending the standing requirements in New York City’s
housing code. Furthermore, the law requires that a violation issue,
usually in response to a tenant’s complaint, and that the landlord
have time to correct the violations before fines are assessed.258
Housing code violations at individual addresses are easily accessible
by the public through the website for the Department of Housing
Preservation and Development.259 Therefore, if the law were a
whistleblower statute like the FCA, which precludes claims based
on “publicly disclosed” information,260 it would prevent anyone
from bringing a qui tam claim. If the whistleblower statute were
more permissive, like the pre-WWII version of the FCA, it could
result in abuse.261 People could comb through public records
searching for uncorrected violations so that they could file a suit and
claim the bounty. Therefore, an aggrieved party qui tam statute
would be a better fit for housing codes.
A more nettlesome problem is how to apply the notice
requirements common in qui tam statutes to housing code
enforcement. The FCA and PAGA require the relator to give the
responsible agency sixty and sixty-five days, respectively,262 to
decide whether to intervene. However, when it comes to housing
conditions, that amount of time can have serious consequences for a
tenant’s health. In fact, for some immediately hazardous conditions,
like lack of heat or hot water, the landlord is required to make repairs
immediately or face serious fines.263 This would weigh in favor of a
short review period. Furthermore, the review period should be
257 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115 (2020).
258 Uzdavines, supra note 24, at 163–69.
259 See HPD Online, NYC HOUS. PRES. & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site
/hpd/about/hpd-online.page (last visited Nov. 29, 2020).
260 Beck, supra note 20, at 562.
261 See Bales, supra note 147, at 388–89 (explaining how the statute was
abused).
262 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(2)(B) (2020).
263 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115 (2020); Dep’t of Hous. and Dev. of the
City of New York v. DeBona, 476 N.Y.S.2d 190, 190–91 (N.Y. App. 1984).
488 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
eliminated when the violations are immediately hazardous.
However, the government could preserve its ability to intervene
throughout the entire case. The ability to intervene would also help
to prevent any due process or excessive fines violations that could
occur as the result of an overzealous private attorney.264
E. Challenges of Applying Qui Tam to Housing
A qui tam housing statute would likely raise two issues of
concern: (1) that the legislation will encourage frivolous lawsuits
and (2) that landlords will pass the costs associated with stronger
enforcement on to tenants.
Opponents of a qui tam housing statute could argue that it will
encourage tenants to damage their homes in order to claim a
financial reward.265 There is some evidence to support this
argument. An analysis of the FCA concluded that the qui tam
provision encouraged a “significant number of frivolous suits.”266
Additionally, the analysis found that the Attorney General could
have independently discovered and prosecuted many of the claims
brought by relators.267 These conclusions suggested that “the qui
tam provision of the FCA is not as valuable in protecting the public
interest as proponents claim, since it allows relators to receive funds
that the government would otherwise earn.”268 However, the study’s
analysis of Illinois’ false claims act revealed that the state attorney
general failed to discover any fraud absent the help of relators.269
Therefore, for states that lack the resources for effective
enforcement, qui tam provisions have the potential to “greatly
benefit the public interest.”270 Furthermore, in the case of housing
264 See Elmore, supra note 21, at 403 (describing how the Eighth and
Fourteenth amendments constrain overzealous prosecution of state qui tam
statutes).
265 Burgess v. Meyer, 975 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 2013) (containing
allegations from landlord that tenants created or exacerbated hazardous conditions
in the home).
266 Broderick, supra note 159, at 965.
267 Id. at 976.
268 Id. at 980.
269 Id. at 992.
270 Id. at 997.
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code enforcement, the risk of frivolous lawsuits would be minimized
by several provisions that already exist in New York City’s Housing
Maintenance Code. First, the Code requires a violation to issue from
a government agency.271 Therefore, the tenant cannot claim a bounty
in an enforcement action until a government official has verified that
violations exist. Second, New York City allows landlords to escape
civil penalties when the tenant is responsible for the damage or the
tenant has inhibited the landlord’s attempts to make repairs.272 These
provisions would make it difficult for relators to pursue frivolous
lawsuits under the housing code.
Another common objection to pro-tenant legislation is that costs
will be passed on to the tenants.273 Indeed, when New York passed
the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019—a historic
package of legislation aimed at closing loopholes used to displace
low-income tenants—the state’s most powerful real estate lobby
warned that many properties would “fall into disrepair” because the
new laws disincentivized landlords from maintaining their
buildings.274 In fact, the opposite occurred.275 New York City
experienced a decrease in housing code violations because landlords
were no longer incentivized to harass tenants by neglecting
repairs.276 However, there is some evidence to support the assertion
that enhanced housing code enforcement can increase rents.277 A
2019 research paper analyzing building code violations in Chicago
found that a 10% increase in resolved violations correlated with a
271 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115(b) (2020).
272 Id. § 27-2116(b)(2)(iii) (2020).
273 Daniel P. Schwallie, Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a
Mechanism for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASEW. RES.
525, 539 (1990).
274 Sydney Pereira, In Wake of New Rent Laws, Housing Maintenance





277 ROBIN BARTRAM, THE COST OF CODE VIOLATIONS: HOW BUILDING
CODES SHAPE RESIDENTIAL SALES PRICES AND RENTS 1 (July 24, 2019), https://
nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Bartram_The-Cost-of-Code-Violations-How-
Building-Codes-Shape-Residential-Sales-Prices-an-Rents.pdf.
490 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
5.5% increase in rents.278 However, the study also showed that
unresolved code violations had no statistically significant effect on
rents.279 Therefore, while tenants did pay higher rent for better
housing, they received no benefit when the housing degraded.280
Instead, those benefits went to the landlord who was able to avoid
paying the cost of repairs without reducing the rent.281
CONCLUSION
A qui tam provision in housing codes will advance housing
justice.282 It would fairly compensate tenants for their injuries and
for their enforcement efforts.283 It would also be a powerful tool for
vulnerable communities to fight back against slumlords and
developers who seek to profit from America’s racist housing
system.284 A qui tam housing statute would not only benefit the
millions of Americans who live in substandard housing, but it could
also lower aggregate social costs that affect everyone’s well-
being.285 Furthermore, it would be relatively simple for some
jurisdictions to implement a qui tam provision in their housing
codes: they could simply alter their statutes to allow qui tam claims
instead of derivative claims.286 In addition to prosecuting fraud,
labor violations, and pirates,287 qui tam could also be used to
improve housing.
278 Id. at 6.
279 Id. at 7.
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 See supra Part IV.C.
283 See supra Part IV.B.
284 See Sabbeth, supra note 53, at 119–20 (describing how vulnerable
tenants, particularly low-income tenants of color, struggle to enforce their legal
rights).
285 See supra Part I (describing the burden substandard housing places on
individuals and on society at large).
286 See supra Part IV.D.
287 See supra Part III (describing the historical applications of qui tam).
